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HOW NONVIOLENCE
CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE
ON VIEQUES:
Olsen: Civil
Disobedience on Vieques:
How Nonviolence
Defeated the U.S.
DEFEATED THE U.S. MILITARY
FrancesOlsen*

My Article deals with the question of how the people of Vieques,
Puerto Rico, were able to defeat the U.S. military with nonviolent civil
disobedience and what lessons we can learn from this victory.
Vieques is a small island off the coast of Puerto Rico. It is eighteen
miles long and three and a half miles wide and is located just a few miles
southeast of the main island. Christopher Columbus caught site of the
island as he sailed by on November 18, 1493, and he wrote in his journal
that Vieques was "the loveliest of islands."' It is a beautiful island, with
lush vegetation and pristine beaches. The water is a beautiful shade of
blue. Some 450 years later, members of the U.S. military looked at the
island - during the early years of World War II - and their first thought
apparently was "what a lovely place to drop bombs!"
The U.S. military expropriated most ofthe land on the island beginning
in the 1940s, and the Navy used the entire east end of this beautiful island
for target practice - carrying out military war games with live
ammunition from 1948 until May 1, 2003, when the Navy was forced to
leave. Between November 1941 and February 1943 the U.S. military
expropriated 21,000 acres of land in Vieques - paying small sums of
money to 8 people who claimed legal title to the land and then forcing
7,000 of the 9,000 people of the island to move. Three thousand were
moved to the island of St. Croix and another 4,000 were moved to a 3-mile
strip of land in the center area of Vieques. The Navy claimed the entire
east end of the island and the west end of the island leaving a strip in the
middle - less than one-quarter of the island where the population of
Vieques was allowed to remain.2
* Professor of Law, UCLA; Visiting Professor of Law, Universidad Alberta Hurtado,
Santiago, Chile. This Article is based on a presentation I made to the LatCrit conference, held in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2003. I would like to thank Professor Guillermo Figueroa-Prieto
of the University of Puerto Rico School of Law who did so much to facilitate my visit to Vieques
in the spring of 2000, and Professor Cdsar J. Ayala for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this Article.
1. See ELIZABETH LANGHORNE, VIEQUES: HISTORY OF A SMALL ISLAND 1 (1987).
2. See SPECIAL PANEL ON MILITARY OPERATIONS ON VIEQUES REPORT TO THE SECRETARY

[hereinafter REPORT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Oct1999/vig l01899.html (last visited May 12, 2004). The situation is actually more complicated.
Because ofthe construction boom right after the expropriation, better-paying jobs became available
and the population rose from about 10,000 in 1940 to 14,000 in 1943. The population dropped
OF DEFENSE, (1999),
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The military claims that it gave the residents lots of time to leave
between a month and a year. But a number of the people themselves claim
that they were forced to move on twenty-four hours notice or less
permanently losing the homes where they had lived for years, sometimes

their whole lives.
By 1950 the military had expropriated a total of 25,360 acres of
Vieques. The U.S. Navy was not a good neighbor to the people of Vieques.
Although the military did provide work for a small number of the residents
of Vieques, this work often came in the form of jobs for prostitutes. 3 Of
course, all these problems are sadly familiar to anyone living near a U.S.
military base.4 What was more unique in Vieques was that the Navy
dropped bombs regularly on the east end of the island.

again when the focus of the war shifted to North Africa and the Navy stopped construction on
Vieques. See Las Expropiaciones de los anos Cuarenta y el Desahucio de la Poblacion Civil en
Vieques, available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/ayala/Vieques/ayalacarro.ppt (last
visited July 15, 2004). Immigration from Vieques to St. Croix had started in the 1930s because of
the effect the sugar crisis had on the Vieques economy. The population was reconcentrated in the
center of Vieques, with about ninety percent of the population coming to live on twenty percent of
the land, resulting in loss of jobs, housing and access to the tropical ecology. Most of the
subsistence activities of the population - garden crops, crabbing, etc. - were destroyed, creating
crowded and miserable conditions. See Cesar J. Ayala, From SugarPlantationsto MilitaryBases:
The US. Navy's Expropriationsin Vieques, Puerto Rico, 1940-45, 13 CENTRO-J.CUNYCENTER
FOR PUERTO RICAN STUD. 23-41 (2001); Maribel Veaz, Las Expropriacionesde la Ddcada del
Cuarentaen Vieques, 56 REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO 159-213 (1995).
The Caribbean Project for Justice and peace conducted 53 interviews in Vieques in 1979 in which
elderly residents testified to being forced to leave their houses on 24 hours notice, to women having
to give birth under tents, and to other inhumane treatment. Cesar Ayala & Viviana Carro,
ExpropriationsandDisplacementofCivilians in Vieques, 1940-1950, in PUERTO RICO: POLITICAL
PERSECUTION AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (R. Bosque Pdrez & J. Col6n Morera eds.,

forthcoming 2004).
3.

KATHERINE T. MCCAFFREY, MILITARY POWER AND POPULAR PROTEST: THE U.S. NAVY

IN VIEQUES, PUERTO RICO 14-15, 52 (2002).

4. See id. (discussing the incidence of rape at U.S. bases in Kosovo and Okinawa); also see
Robert Rabin, US. MilitaryWages War AgainstltselfandAgainstthe World, VIEQUES LIBRE, Sept.
2, 2001, available at http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/articles/cprdv_09_02_01_eng.htm (last
visited May 12, 2004).
A series of rapes of young girls and other violent acts by U.S. military personnel
in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Philippines and Panama, remind us of the violence
against Viequense women by gangs of Marines in the streets of Vieques in the
1950s and 60s. The death of "Mapepe" Christian, an old man in the Destino area
of Vieques who was brutally kicked and punched by several soldiers in 1952, is
repeated constantly in U.S. military zones on every continent.
Id.
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It was like living in a war zone from the 1940s on. Terrible noise
disrupted concentration by day and sleep by night. The vibrations were
like earthquakes. Planes flew low overhead at all hours and large trucks
rumbled by. The activities of the Navy caused pollution and accidents
were always a risk. The Navy was thoughtless and careless.
School classes were frequently disrupted by the noise of bombs
airplanes and helicopters flew overhead drowning out the teachers and
military trucks passed daily within fifty feet of the intermediate school

creating a deafening roar. Explosions and vibrations from the bombs
caused the school buildings to shake and develop cracks and other damage.
People were awakened by bombs and by the noise of airplanes at all hours.
The cancer rate on Vieques is significantly higher than in the rest of Puerto
Rico. Vieques suffers a higher mortality rate than the rest of Puerto Rico
and a higher infant mortality rate.
As a result of the Navy's unneighborliness, a protest movement sprang
up in the 1970s and activists filed a number of lawsuits against the Navy.'
On February 6, 1978, thirty fishing boats sailed into the zone that the Navy
told them to stay out of, disrupting the military maneuvers being carried
out by the U.S. Navy and the Brazilian military.6 There was a wave of

protest activity, including civil disobedience by fishermen at sea and by
other trespassers by land. These protests were brutally suppressed in a
pattern of use of excessive force, police misconduct, even attempted
murder of some of the leaders of the protests.7 Federal courts imposed
severe penalties on the demonstrators. 8 One of the protesters - a Vietnam

5. See, e.g., Roger Trilling, Vieques: The Navy, The Island and the Deal, EL ANDAR,
Summer 2001 (describing the case brought by Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo against the Navy
for environmental infractions), availableat http://www.elandar.com/vieques/storyvieques2.html
(last visited May 12, 2004).
6. The Navy "rented" Vieques out to allied military regimes for their use and used the island
for joint exercises with allied military troops. See id.; see also LISA MULLENNEAUx, NI UNA BOMBA
MAS: VIEQUES VS. U.S. NAVY (2000).
7. MCCAFFREY, supra note 3, at 88-89.
The navy boat disembarked with armed federal marshals and moved forward to
arrest demonstrators ... Protestors screamed in outrage as groups of marshals
forcibly dragged their compatriots across the beach and up the ramp onto the navy
boat.... In one shot, a heavy female marshal, wearing a helmet and black glasses,
a gun in her holster, kneels on the back of an old woman and handcuffs her,
pressing the woman's face into the sand.
Id.
8. Id. at 89-90. Many of the demonstrators were convicted of federal trespassing charges
and given sentences of six months in federal prison in addition to a $500 fine. Id.
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veteran named Angel Rodriguez Cristobal - was jailed in Tallahassee,
Florida, and murdered in prison on November 11, 1979.9 The prison
system denied it was murder, but the Puerto Ricans I have spoken with
seem convinced, and are convincing when arguing that it was murder. A
book was published a couple of years ago documenting the repression and
illegal suppression of the Puerto Rican independence movement. 0
But repression worked and things settled down. In October 1983, the
Navy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to settle a federal case
the government of Puerto Rico had brought against the Navy." The Navy
made numerous promises in four areas: 1) community assistance - The
Navy promised to help the people of Vieques achieve economic
development and to foster cultural activities; 2) land use - The Navy
promised to allow people to use the land as much as possible and to
finance a forestation project that was intended to develop a civilian-run
forestry industry; 3) the Navy promised it would minimize noise, use as
little live ammunition as possible, and keep records of un-detonated bombs
in the east end of the island. 2 The Navy promised to give fifteen days
advance notice of major military exercises and that it would not interfere
with the activities of the civilian population; and 4) environmental issues
- the Navy promised to undertake a wide variety of activities and accept
limitations on its use of the land in order to protect whales, turtles,
pelicans, and other endangered species. 3 Whether the Navy ever intended
to live up to these promises or not, in practice they seemed to ignore them.
As one report recently put it: "On the one hand, the people of Vieques
point out that the Navy has not met its contractual obligations, and on the
other, the Navy seems not to have made an effort to meet its
responsibilities as a good neighbor."' 4
Conditions on Vieques were very bad for the civilian population and
protests never actually stopped, but they decreased and much of the
population settled into an uncomfortable state of depressed resignation.
Those people from the United States who supported the people of Vieques
found other issues that seemed more pressing and many of the people on

9. Id. at 90.

10.

COMISION ESPECIAL SOBRE VIEQUES, EL RESUMEN EJECUTIVO DEL INFORME (1999)

[hereinafter INFORME] (the translations are those ofthe author), available at http://www.fire.or.cr/
comision.htm (last visited May 12, 2004).

11.

Trilling, supra note 5.

12. See REPORT, supra note 2.
13. Id.
14. See INFORME, supra note 10.
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the big island of Puerto Rico focused their own attention on other issues,
too.
This all changed, or began to change, on April 19, 1999 when a Navy
F-18 aircraft that was participating in a training maneuver on Vieques
dropped two five-hundred pound bombs well off target and hit its own
Navy observation post, injuring four people and killing David Sanes
Rodriguez, a civilian citizen of Vieques who worked as a security guard
for the Navy."
The people of Vieques united in their grief and outrage. Some friends
of David Sanes held a memorial service for him on the east end of the
island that was supposed to be off limits to unauthorized civilians. Navy
personnel placed a large white cross near the spot where he was killed. At
the conclusion of the memorial service, one of his friends decided to
remain there where David Sanes had been killed.1 6 That night a second
person - one who had been present at the memorial service but left
returned with food and supplies, saying that he could not leave one person
there alone. Over the next few days and weeks more and more people went
to the east end of the island of Vieques and set up civil disobedience
protest camps. Camps sprang up like mushrooms after a rain. There was
one camp for schoolteachers. There was also a religious camp and a
consecrated Catholic church built on the bombing range. The fishermen
had a camp on a tiny island you could almost swim to; I kayaked to it. The
most elaborate and comfortable of the camps was set up by Rubdn Berrios
Martinez, a Professor of Law at the University of Puerto Rico and a leader
of the Puerto Rican Independence Party. The Bar Association of Puerto
Rico supported the civil disobedience. The Independence Party was
gaining more popularity than it had enjoyed in a long time because of its
very visible presence in the Vieques protest.
The conservative then-Governor of Vieques, Pedro Rossell6,
established a Commission on May 11, 1999 to "study the situation of
Vieques, the effects of the Navy's activities, and strategies and alternatives
available to the Governor to halt Navy activities and to produce a
recommendation as to what the official position of the people of Puerto
Rico should be."17
The Commission was given just forty-five days to complete its work
and submit its report. The Navy was not cooperative. The Commission

15. See MULLENNEAUX, supra note 6.
16. The friend was Alberto de Jesds, who is a prominent environmental activist well known

by the nickname Tito Kayak. He was later jailed for one year in New York for climbing atop the
statue of liberty and unfurling the Vieques flag.
17. REPORT, supra note 2.
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was set up on May 11 and was to report to the Governor on June 25. The
Navy met with the Commission June 2 and did not answer many of the
questions the Commission members posed. So the Commission agreed to
submit the questions in writing and to hold another meeting with the Navy
for further discussion. On June 17 -just one week before the final report
was due - the Navy sent partial answers to the Commission's questions,
announced it was processing the Commission's requests under the (slow
and cumbersome) Freedom of Information Act, and proclaimed that since
the Secretary of the Navy had ordered a review of the activities of the
Navy and the Marines in Vieques, no further meetings with the
Commission would be held - supposedly in order not to prejudice the
results of the review.18
The Commission made a field visit to Vieques to view the area
firsthand, and again, the Navy was not candid or cooperative. The Navy
initially claimed that only M-16 rifles, pistols, and other small arms were
used in an infantry training area, which was located right next to a
residential area.1 9 The Navy officials were asked the reason for the size of
the impact marks on the tanks that had been used as targets, for these
impact marks were clearly not from small arms, and there was no answer.
Two hours later, a member of the Naval delegation brought to the attention
of the Commission that in fact that area was used for light anti-tank
missiles, but that none had fallen into the sea. When the members of the
Commission pressed for further information, he answered that perhaps one
might have fallen into the sea. The following day, the members of the
Commission were taken by sea to the outskirts of the very area examined
the day before. It was cause for consternation to see hundreds of missiles
on the sea bed.20
The Commission discovered on its own - by way of a document that
a nonprofit organization had obtained under the Freedom of Information
Act - that depleted uranium had been used on Vieques. 2" The Navy then
claimed that one of the Marine aircraft had accidentally fired 263 bullets
(25-millimeter) that used depleted uranium in the casings, that they
recovered 57 of the casings, and that the Navy had notified the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Environmental Quality Board of the
mishap. But the Environmental Quality Board stated that it had never been
notified and the specific person named by the Navy as its contact on the

18.
19.
20.
21.

See INFORME, supra note 10.
See id.
Id.
See id. (details from Report).
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Environmental Quality Board issued a sworn statement denying that he
had been so notified.
The Navy also denied any responsibility for the elevated cancer rate on
Vieques. The Environmental Quality Board of Puerto Rico, however,
concluded that there were three possible sources of pollution from the
Navy: 1) chemical compounds of projectiles themselves; 2) particles of
dust and rock propelled into the atmosphere from the projectiles; and 3)
metal debris from projectiles and the scrap metal used for target practice. 2 2
The water of Vieques has been found to have quantities of the explosives
RDX and Tetryl in it that seemingly could only have gotten there through
the air. Therefore, many would argue that it stands to reason that the
people of Vieques must also breathe these explosives from the same air.
On June 25, the Special Commission on Vieques issued a rather
amazing report in which the fairly diverse and certainly not radical group
reached the consensus that the Navy should leave Vieques. Their first
recommendation was:
1. That the Navy immediately and permanently cease and desist
military activities on Vieques. Given the gravity of the findings of
this Special Commission, the Commission also recommends the
orderly and expeditious transfer of the lands by the Navy to the
people of Vieques, for their use and enjoyment. 2 3
The fourth recommendation stated further:
4. The return of the lands to the people of Vieques for their use and
enjoyment must be done in an orderly manner, taking the necessary
measures to protect the citizens from explosives. Under the
supervision of the Government of Puerto Rico, the Navy will be
held responsible for cleaning up and decontaminating all land,
superficial or underwater, and all bodies of water and aquifers. 24
The unanimous and strong report by this diverse group provided a
wonderful basis for the solidarity that continued to be a remarkable feature
of the situation.
Lots of people from the big island of Puerto Rico - and eventually
from around the world - began visiting Vieques. On weekends a
ferryboat full of people would sail from the big island to Vieques to visit,
22. See id.
23. INFORME, supra note 10.
24. Id.
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offer support to the movement against the Navy's presence, and buy
souvenirs, including hats and t-shirts telling the Navy to get out of Vieques
and other pro-Vieques slogans.
As well as the numerous civil disobedience camps at which people
risked arrest, there was also a legal camp set up right outside the gate of
the Navy Camp Garcia. This was named the Peace and Justice Camp and
run by a group called the Committee for the Rescue and Development of
Vieques.25 This camp was easy for visitors to get to, and with regular
celebrations and events taking place there - from discussions to music
concerts to political rallies 26 - this legal camp provided a useful and
convenient focal point for people wanting to become involved in the
struggle against the Navy's treatment of the island. In addition, many
people visited the "illegal" campsites established in the supposedly
restricted zone. Fisherman - among the most activist opponents of the
Navy, including some of the leaders of the 1970s protests, regularly ferried
visitors, food and supplies to the camps in their small, fast and
maneuverable motorboats.
Puerto Rico held elections for Governor, and Sila Calderon, the
Commonwealth Party candidate, ran on an anti-Navy platform. She had
served on the Commission that recommended the Navy's departure from
Vieques, so her platform was credible and consistent. In addition, she may
well have thought that her strong anti-Navy stand would be a useful way
to undercut support the Independence Party could otherwise expect to get
from its high profile on the issue. Sila Calderon won the election.
The civil disobedience stand-off continued for more than a year,
preventing the Navy from operating on Vieques until May 4, 2000. Shortly
before that, the FBI had raided Miami's Little Havana and returned Elian
Gonzalez to the custody of his father - alienating the vocal Cuban right
wing centered in Miami. The government then apparently decided to
alienate the Latina-Latino left wing and invaded the Vieques civil
disobedience camps - arresting some two hundred people.27 The civil

25. This group was founded in 1993 to educate and mobilize the community to end the
military presence on Vieques. In June, 2003, it held its l th annual assembly on the Island of
Vieques. See Berta Joubert-Ceci, Repression Continues in Vieques, WORKERS WORLD, July 10,
2003, available at http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/vieques0710.php (last visited May 12, 2004).
26. Cultura Proffetica's song "Bieka," the indigenous Taino word for Vieques, advocated the
removal of the U.S. Navy from the island.
27. MCCAFFREY, supra note 3, at 170.
At dawn on May 4, 2000, heavily armed federal agents arrived by helicopter to
remove hundreds ofprotestors from the bombing range. Local community leaders,
artists, elected officials from Puerto Rico and the United States (including two
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disobedience nevertheless continued and a steady stream of people were
arrested. 28
Before he left office, President Clinton agreed that if the people of
Vieques voted against the Navy in a referendum, he would order the Navy
to leave. 29 President Bush was pressured into announcing, in June 2001,
that the Navy would leave Vieques - as soon as it could find a suitable,
alternative training site to bomb. 30
Even after September 11, 2001,3' the people of Vieques were able to
maintain solidarity. Under pressure, Bush agreed to leave on May 1,
2003.32 Before the Navy would leave Vieques, the Secretary of the Navy
had to certify that there were alternative training sites.33 In January, 2003,
the Secretary of the Navy made the required certification to the Congress
and the President that there were such alternative training sites. The
Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques claimed with
some justification that

members of the U.S. House of Representatives), church leaders, the heads of the
Puerto Rican Independence Party, and ordinary citizens were cuffed with plastic
bands and hauled off the range in trucks.
Id.
28. Id.
In the aftermath of the May arrests tensions heightened between residents and the
nay .... the focus on peace and civil disobedience transformed the current
mobilization from the charged and volatile mobilization of the seventies....
When demonstrators were pepper sprayed and tear gassed by the riot squad,
activists took bullhorns and reminded people to stay calm.
Id. at 170-71.
29. Id. at 179 ("President Clinton issued an executive directive in January 2000 that
instructed the navy to return all eight thousand acres of the former Naval Ammunition Facility
(NAF) on the western side of Vieques to the government of Puerto Rico.").
30. Duncan Campbell, IslandersDeclare Victory over U.S. Bombers, THE GUARDIAN, May
2, 2003.
31. Some people feared that in the wave of "patriotism" following the airplane attacks that
took place on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, it
would prove nearly impossible to maintain an anti-military stance.
32. MCCAFFREY, supra note 3, at 173 ("Bush yielded to mounting pressure, while offering
a timeline that allowed the Navy to continue to use the range as it searched for an alternative
training location.").
33. Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Briefing on Vieques,
June 15, 2003.
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[t]he determination by the Secretary of the Navy also certifies the
effectiveness of civil disobedience and the consistent denunciation
and protests by all sectors of Puerto Rican society in favor of peace
for Vieques. It is a testimony to the power of an organized
community that is committed to a peaceful but militant struggle,
and to the perseverance of the Vieques community - not for years
but for decades. The organized groups here have contributed during
more than half a century, to a level of consciousness and spirit of
struggle that has made it possible for this "tiny" community, with
enormous solidarity and massive support from all of Puerto Rico,
to paralyze the most powerful military force in the history of
humanity. The certification is evidence of the power of people
organized and in the streets, of fisherman in the sea, of women and
men, youth and elders, people from all ideological sectors
political as well as religious - a community united and committed
to justice and peace."
One indication of the nature and extent of the victory by the resistance
against the Navy can be found in the complaints from those on the other
side. On January 10, 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations stated in a
memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy that:
physical security at Vieques is becoming ever more difficult and
costly to maintain, given the civil unrest which accompanies the
Navy's presence on the island. We have been successful in
completing our training on the island only because of extremely
aggressive and costly multi-agency security actions. The level of
protests, attempted incursions, and isolated successful incursions
generally remain high when Battle Group training occurs on the
island.... Navy's departure from Vieques will liberate us from this
burden.35
The same day the Commandant of the Marine Corps complained in his
memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy:
I am disappointed in the fact that of the many places Sailors and
Marines are welcomed with open arms, both at home and abroad,

34. COMMITTEE FOR THE RESCUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF VIEQUES, REPORT FROM THE PEACE

AND JUSTICE CAMP (2003) [hereinafter CRDV REPORT], availableat http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/
caab/articles/vieques206.htm (last visited May 12, 2004).
35. Id.
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have
particularly in Vieques some in Puerto Rico demonstrated an appalling hostility towards Sailors, Marines and
their requirement for pre-deployment training; this at a particularly
dangerous time in our nation's history. This hostility stands
virtually alone in contrast with the warm relations and appreciation
expressed by the communities near our naval installations
elsewhere in the nation, and indeed, around the globe.36

-

It seems to me that the success so far can be attributed to several factors.
One of the most important factors was the solidarity that was maintained
among the local residents on the Island of Vieques. Neither the threats nor
the cajolery of the Navy succeeded in undermining this solidarity. The
solidarity may well have been purchased at the price of compromises
compromises that seemed to some to go too far.
For example, early on in the protest, the activists at the Peace and
Justice Camp had chained closed and locked the gates at Camp Garcia,
giving the keys to the locks to three female residents of Vieques, so that
they could choose when to allow the Navy to enter and leave or to allow
the local civilians employed by the military to enter the camp to work, and
when to leave the gates closed. The local priest labeled this action violent
and insisted that the Peace and Justice chains be removed from the military
gates. However reluctantly and with whatever reservations, the organizers
allowed this ultimatum to carry the day and the chains were removed.
Solidarity was maintained, and eventually this solidarity served well the
cause of antimilitarism.
Another important factor contributing to the success of the movement
was the solidarity and support of people from mainland United States,
especially the Puerto Rican members of Congress and members of the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus. The Special Commission on Vieques in
its June 25, 1999 report had recommended "[t]hat a working group be
created . . . [and] identify and involve groups linked to the cause of
Vieques, especially in Puerto Rican and Hispanic communities .. .37 The
support of the Hispanic Caucus of Congress and especially Congressman
Jose E. Serrano was also extraordinarily helpful in reducing the option of
outright repression. Identity politics facilitates the power of non-violent
civil disobedience.
However appealing it might be to end on the positive note of the
departure of the Navy from Vieques, it is also important to recognize that
in fact the battle continues. From early on, the Committee for the Rescue
36. Id.
37. INFORME, supra note 10.
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and Development of Vieques talked about the 4 D's, echoing Franklin
Roosevelt's 4 Freedoms: demilitarization, decontamination, devolution
(return of lands), and development (sustainable and controlled by the
people).38
The Navy did not return the land to the people of Vieques, but rather
turned title over to U.S. Department of Fish and Wildlife. This was
supposedly to preserve the land, but in fact to try to avoid the
responsibility for cleaning up the environmental damage the Navy did to
the land and surrounding sea during more than fifty years of incessant
bombing. In public hearings held on the island of Vieques in the spring of
2003, officials of the Interior Department admitted that the U.S. Armed
Forces makes a practice of turning contaminated lands over to the Interior
Department in order the minimize the requirements of clean up that might
otherwise fall on the military. 39 The Memorandum of Agreement between
the Navy and the U.S. Department of Interior includes an Article XII that
claims that even after the formerly military lands on the island might be
transferred to any people or any government entity in Puerto Rico,
"Interior shall include in any instruments effecting such transfer or
conveyance those terms, conditions, restrictive covenants, easements,
reservations, or similar provisions on behalf of the United States that are
necessary to prevent any derogation of the Land Use Controls or Navy's
rights of access." 40 While the exact meaning of this provision is far from
clear, the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques refers
to the language as "worrisome." 4
Civil disobedience and the maintenance of solidarity appear to have
won the battle for demilitarization and they may win a return of the lands,
or devolution, opening the battle over development. The battle continues
over decontamination and it would be premature to hold a victory party.
It may well be that Vieques will expose the extent to which the U.S.
military has systematically avoided responsibility for cleaning up its
environmental disasters, not only in Vieques, but also in some parts of the

38. CRDV REPORT, supra note 34.
39. See Vieques' Victories... andChallengesAhead, FELLOWSHIPOF RECONCILIATION WEB
SITE, June 2003, at http://www.forusa.org/programs/puertorico/pr update_0602b.html (last visited
July 1, 2004).
40. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
NAVY AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROPERTIES ON THE EASTERN END OF VIEQUES ISLAND TO THE
OF THE INTERIOR art. XII, available at http://southeast.fws.gov/vieques/
ViequesFinalMOA.43003.html (last visited July 15, 2004).
41. E-mail from Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques (Apr. 2004) (on file
with author).
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continental United States, to say nothing of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
Iraq.
So it would be premature to declare victory, but we should nevertheless
celebrate successes and evaluate their causes, as we remain vigilant that
the successes be followed up with further successes, and that they do in
fact lead to real change.
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